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1. Today I want to look at the recent Court of Appeal judgment in 
the Clayton Weatherston appeal, which raised issues of when a 
conviction can be overturned because of statements made in the 
media during trial. Before I look at the decision in detail though, 
I want to explain a bit of background to this area of the law. 
 
2. The law of contempt is not the only method of dealing with the 
prejudicial effect of media comment. Others include 
discontinuance of a trial, change of venue, and, as in this case, 
appeal against conviction. 
 
3. Sometimes excessive media comment will cause the trial judge to 
discontinue the trial and discharge the jury. Generally then, the 
trial will be held at a later date when the effect of the 
prejudicial publicity has dissipated, and perhaps at a different 
venue. In only the rarest case is it ever held that the publicity 
has destroyed the possibility of a fair trial ever being held. 
 
4. But if there is no discontinuance, or abortion, and, following 
conviction an appeal is filed, in fact appeals on the ground of 
adverse media publicity do not often succeed either. The court 
usually finds in the light of after-events that the publicity did not 
in fact result in a miscarriage of justice. This is what happened in 
the Weatherston appeal. 
 
5. As everyone no doubt recalls, in 2009, New Zealand media 
reported extensively on the Weatherston murder trial in which, 
unusually, Mr Weatherston pleaded guilty to killing the victim, but 
gave lengthy evidence in his own defence hoping to procure a 
verdict of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal in the latest 
judgment refers to a ‘blaze of publicity’, in which media broadcast 
the accused giving grisly evidence about how the killing occurred.  
The manner in which Mr Weatherston behaved while giving 
evidence was repugnant to some viewers and disquiet was 
expressed about repetition of the coverage, in particular by the 
use of slow motion replay. However that was not specifically the 
subject of the appeal. Mr Weatherston complained about two 
other things, which occurred, his counsel argued, against the 
backdrop of the blaze of publicity I’ve already described. 
 
6. One was a television interview by Dr Warren Young, the Deputy 
President of the Law Commission on TVNZ and the other was the 
publication of two back-to-back articles in the Listener, “The 
Provocation Debate: A law both hated and hailed”  on 25 July 
2009 and “The final insult”in the same edition. 
 
7. Both the interview and the magazine articles arose from another 
murder trial which involved the defence of provocation, the 
Ambach trial. The jury in that case found Ambach not guilty of 
murder but, because of provocation, guilty only of 
manslaughter. This followed a string of cases where the defence 
had relied on provocation and the verdicts had not been well 
received. 
 
8. In Weatherston, the trial judge, Potter J had dealt with the wall 
to wall media coverage by warning and advising the jury. She 
constantly reminded the jury to judge Dr Weatherston 
exclusively on the evidence heard in Court and not to read or 
watch anything concerning the trial. Following the Ambach verdict 
and the publicity surrounding it, she gave a special direction to 
the jury about ignoring references in the media or anywhere else. 
 
9. Mr Weatherston’s case did not attack any of the directions 
Justice Potter gave to the jury. It was argued instead that the 
media comments were so harmful to his defence that nothing 
short of aborting the trial would have put things right. Because 
the Judge had refused several applications to abort the trial, the 
Court of Appeal had to decide whether the comments were so 
damaging that continuing the trial was unfair. It reached two 
preliminary conclusions:  
a. First the interview with Dr Young was on a minor tv channel, 
TV7, with the only part of it that was picked up on TVOne 
being about general law reform issues relating to 
provocation, which the Law Commission had carried out.  
b. The Listener articles did refer to the Ambach case but also 
a number of other cases where provocation had been raised, 
sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The Court of Appeal 
therefore found the articles were balanced, referring to 
views on both sides of the fence. 
 
10. The Court then found on the facts that the publications did 
not result in unfairness because: 
a. there was no evidence of any kind that any juror actually 
saw the Young interview or the Listener articles.  
b. even if a juror had read the Listener articles, the articles' 
tone was balanced and cerebral. They did not comment in 
any way on the Weatherston trial.  
c. even if a juror had seen the Young interview, Dr Young, as 
Deputy President of the Law Commission, would not be seen 
as an “authority figure” whose view must or should be 
followed. In fact the Court expressed the somewhat cynical 
view that there are today few, if any, “authority figures” 
whose views are unquestionably followed by anyone! It also 
noted that Dr Young was not in any way counselling juries to 
ignore the existing law.  
d. The Court expressed great confidence in the robustness and 
integrity of juries. It did not accept that the jury might 
have ignored the judge’s directions. There was nothing in 
the record to indicate such disobedience, nor had the 
foreperson indicated any problems had arisen. The Court 
endorsed the view that  
‘The criminal system proceeds on an assumption that 
judges' directions are faithfully followed by juries: 
throw away that assumption and every verdict 
becomes suspect. We acknowledge immediately that 
some concerns might be so significant that the court 
(either the trial court itself or an appellate court) 
feels uneasy about dealing with those concerns by 
way of direction. In those cases, aborting the trial 
and starting again becomes the only safe solution. But 
this is not a case which crosses that threshold.’ 
e. The Court also endorsed how the Judge had summed up for 
the jury.  Justice Potter had given the jury a questionnaire 
which they had to follow which left no room for the jury to 
meditate upon or express a view on the defence of 
provocation. By using three step, fact-specific questions, 
the jury were given no latitude to ‘wander off-task.’ EG: Did 
the accused lose the power of self-control?  If yes, go to…’ 
The summing-up also emphasised repeatedly the need for 
the jury to apply the law as the Judge directed them, solely 
on the evidence, not on external information, comment, or 
speculation, and not to access any information about the 
trial or about any matters touching on the trial in the media, 
on the internet, on Facebook or any other source.  
f. the fact that some aspect of the criminal law may be 
controversial did not mean that verdicts in those 
controversial areas are suspect. Jurors take an oath to 
apply the existing law and, in the absence of evidence they 
have breached their oaths, there is no reason to doubt the 
outcome.  
 
 
11. Finally, the Court dealt with an argument about an address Potter 
J delivered at a conference of Australian Supreme and Federal 
Court judges held in Wellington in January this year. Despite the 
address being marked “Confidential: for conference delegates 
only”, it was leaked to Mr Weatherston’s counsel, who then argued 
that  the Judge herself thought that “the response of the public 
to the trial was that they grew to ‘despise’ Clayton Weatherston 
and that his use of the provocation defence to put Sophie Elliott 
on trial was not right”. In short, this argument was that the 
Judge thought that the media's coverage was highly prejudicial. 
 
12. The Court of Appeal rejected this, and found that the Judge’s 
views arose from the evidence at trial, Weatherston’s evidence 
and the way he gave it, and the fact the trial was televised. So 
the opinion had nothing to do with the Young interview or the 
Listener article, neither of which the Judge had mentioned.  
 
13. All of which meant the statements made in the media during 
the trial did not render the trial unfair and this ground of appeal 
was therefore rejected. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
14. This aspect of the case reflects a consistent view of the 
courts that the integrity of the justice system depends on juries 
being trusted to get it right and to follow instructions.  See eg: 
the recent Fraill case in the UK where the Lord Chief Justice, 
Lord Judge, and two other senior judges used the case of Joanne 
Fraill, 40, a juror who admitted chatting with an acquitted 
defendant on Facebook, thus causing an ongoing trial to fall over, 
to warn jurors generally not to undermine the country's "precious 
jury system" by discussing or researching their cases online. 
 
15. This is a view that is under some pressure currently in relation 
to contempt generally – it is seen as relying on a fiction, especially 
in relation to use of the internet.  But the Court in Weatherston 
made it clear that the onus is on a defendant arguing that the 
jury has been led astray to put forward some actual evidence that 
this has happened. It is not for the Crown to show that as a 
matter of fact the jury did behave as instructed by the judge and 
did have integrity. You can see why.  This would require 
examination of juries and invasion of the jury room after the 
event, which might inhibit the free and open discussion which is 
necessary for verdicts to be arrived at.  
 
 
